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Abstract: Business Angels are private individuals (or syndicates) who supply venture capital to
businesses, mainly small start-up firms, in an informal investment market setting. This paper
presents a preliminary analysis from the first phase of a research project that explores the
emergence of Business Angels in the new EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe.
It focuses on case studies conducted in Poland, and examines the role and function of
Business Angels in the context of a transition economy.
JEL Classification: M130, R110
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Introduction
Ever since the publication of the White Paper on Competitiveness (CEC, 1993), the
European Union (EU) has sought to enhance its competitive position in the global
economy through the routes of innovation and entrepreneurship. This led to an
emphasis being placed on support for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the
belief that SMEs are the main creators of new jobs, are more innovative, assist the
competitive environment, and provide the dynamism for growth within both regional
and national economies. In comparison to the United States, Europe has still much to
do in creating this dynamism given the differences in their respective success rates of
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new job creation. It has been estimated that over the last twenty years 35 million jobs
were created in Europe, compared to 68 million in the United States. The need for a
new dynamism and growth in the EU has become even more imperative as it
increases in size by embracing a significant number of the transition economies in
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).
The recent expansion of the EU has led to greater pressures on the its budget,
which in turn limits resources that can be made available to support the SME sector.
The EU argues that it is legitimate to offer support to SMEs on the grounds that they
suffer disproportionately from ‘market failure’ in comparison to large businesses.
One of the key market failures is in the availability and access to equity finance. In
recent years, the supply of start-up and early stage equity finance has become more
acute due to changes in the banking sector which have made lending to small
enterprises unattractive for banks. The primary factors underpinning the banking
sector’s position on SMEs are the low margins, high overhead costs and risk
involved; additionally, venture capital funds are often not able to accommodate the
large number of small deals with heavy due diligence requirements. A potential
solution to these problems is informal investment markets, where finance is provided
by investors known as ‘Business Angels’.
In some EU member states, there is a well established Business Angel market
whilst in others, such as the CEE transition economies, this market and type of
organisation is evolving gradually. This paper examines the functioning of an
established Angel market in Scotland and compares it with the emergent Angel
market in Poland. It is an apposite comparison due to the similarities in their recent
development. Scotland, over the last three decades, has experienced significant
structural change in its economy characterised by a steep decline in traditional sectors
such as manufacturing and heavy industry, followed by a growth in businesses in the
service sector such as finance and banking. This has resulted in policy initiatives
which have sought to increase foreign direct investment (FDI) and develop
indigenous companies through entrepreneurial initiatives. While the emphasis given
to these differing strategies has varied over the last thirty years, we would argue that it
is not dissimilar to the current situation and potential policy response currently faced
by Poland. Poland is also losing its traditional industries and pursuing FDI attraction
strategies, whilst promoting an enterprising economy. In attempting to create a more
entrepreneurial culture and encourage individuals to establish new businesses,
start-up companies in Poland are faced with the immediate issue of raising capital. It
is argued below that Business Angels are increasingly seen to be an important, if not
the most important, source of finance for new and growing businesses. With the
establishment of a national Business Angel Network (BAN) and business angel
syndicates, we would argue that Scotland has a mature market for the provision of
equity finance. This mature market, as analysed below, has continued to evolve and
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provides a good example from which emerging angel markets in countries such as
Poland can learn valuable lessons.
The remainder of the paper organised as follows: first, an introduction to the
concept of Business Angels together with an overview of their role in the venture
capital market is provided; second, an examination of business angels and
entrepreneurial finance initiatives in Scotland is set out; third, the development of
business angels in Poland is charted and fourth, the paper finishes with a comparison
of Scotland and Poland from which conclusions are drawn from the analysis.
The Concept of Business Angels
Business angels are private individuals who invest their own money in a company in
which they have no family connection in return for an equity stake. Angels comprise
the supply side of an informal capital market that has developed to meet an
unsatisfied demand from new ventures and small growing companies for investment
funds. The problems facing new ventures and small, growing companies in securing
finance has long been recognised (Oakey, 1984; Binks et al., 1992; Westhead and
Storey, 1997; Murray, 1999; Cressy, 2002). These businesses are at high risk of
failure, and traditional lenders such as banks are unwilling to invest (Mason and
Harrison, 1996). They are also unattractive to the established venture capital
industry. The funding requirements of small firms are generally well below the
venture capitalists’ minimum threshold level (Lerner, 1998; Van Osnabrugge,
1998a) and the due diligence and transaction costs of providing funding to small
firms are comparatively higher per unit of funds invested. The combined effect of
these supply-side factors is that the demands from entrepreneurs for funds to start and
grow their businesses are greater than the willingness of financial institutions to
supply (Wetzel, 1983; Mason and Harrison, 1993 & 1994; Deakins, 1999). Indeed,
Murray (1999), in a review of problems in the financing of SMEs, concludes that
capital rationing has been identified as a significant and continuing problem ever
since studies of such businesses were first undertaken.
The potential of business angels and the informal venture capital market is
enormous (Van Osnabrugge 1998b). In the United States, Gaston (1989) estimated
that informal investors finance 30-40 times as many firms as the formal venture
capital industry. Freear et.al. (1995) in their study on the financing of
technology-based ventures commented that when angel and venture capital funds are
segmented by the size of a round of financing, the distinctive role of angels in smaller
deals is apparent. Wetzel and Freear (1996) suggest informal investors finance 20
times more ventures than the formal venture capital market and invest five times
more dollars per annum. In the UK, the informal investment market has been
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estimated to be of significantly greater importance to the SME sector than the formal
venture capital market (Mason and Harrison, 1996).
However, the informal venture capital market remains under-researched in both
Europe and North America. The Bank of England has observed that ‘reliable
information on the activities of business angels is scarce’ (2001, p.37); while Lerner
(1998), in an overview of angel financing and public policy in the USA, concludes
that the subject is an area ripe for more intensive research. Early work on business
angels by Wetzel (1983) was followed by further studies in the United States by
Freear et al. (1994) and Berger et al. (1998). Research has also been carried out in a
small number of other countries: for example, the United Kingdom (Mason and
Harrison, 1993, 1994, 1995; Coveney and Moore, 1998; Paul et al., 2003), Sweden
(Landström, 1993), Finland (Lumme et al., 1998), Australia (Hindle and Wenban,
1999) and Norway (Reitan and Sorheim, 2000).
Notwithstanding such research, the number of studies and their depth has been
constrained by the practical difficulties of investigating these informal marketplaces.
Locating business angels is difficult and encouraging a reasonable response rate in
survey based methodologies is problematic. Freear et al. (1994) describe researching
this elusive and nearly invisible market as a ‘challenge’. Two factors are at play, each
reinforcing the other to create problems for the researcher: first, the nature of the
market itself; and second, the attitudes of the main players, the business angels.
Transactions within the informal market are private; and therefore, information about
them is likely to be limited (Fenn et al., 1997). Thus, Berger and Udell (1998, p.616)
suggest that the defining characteristic of small firm finance is ‘informational
opacity’, while Prowse (1998, p.786) refers to the market for angel capital as
operating in ‘almost total obscurity’. As to the attitude of business angels, they have
the reputation of eschewing publicity and sharing their experiences on a
non-attributable basis. Benjamin and Margulis (1996, p.11) comment that informal
investors ‘prize their privacy’.
Business Angels in Scotland
With the continued decline of traditional industries and the limited short-term impact
of foreign direct investment, Scotland has in recent years attempted to promote
indigenous, innovative businesses to compete in the global economy. Its position on
the periphery of Europe is disadvantageous and, in addition to an historic dependence
on heavy engineering, Scotland suffers a below average level of new firm formation
(Scottish Enterprise, 1993). Over the past decade, the economic development agency
for Scotland, Scottish Enterprise, has pursued a policy of new firm creation through
its Business Birth Rate Strategy (BBRS) (Scottish Enterprise, 1993). This has
64 Michael Danson, Ewa Helinska-Hughes, Stuart Paul, Geoff Whittam and Michael Hughes
resulted in a sustained attempt to increase the start-up rate of new enterprises
generally and, in more recent years, high-growth innovative businesses in particular.
As well as their positive impact on employment, such ventures offer lower
displacement potential and greater export and import substitution prospects (Fraser
of Allander, 2001). However, over the period in which the BBRS has been in force
there has been little change in the rate of new firm formation (Fraser of Allander,
2002). One of the reasons may be found in the functioning of the informal investment
market in Scotland where evidence suggests poor alignment of the demand and
supply sides. Entrepreneurs are often unaware of how to secure funding to establish
and develop new enterprises while business angels report a lack of suitable
investment opportunities (Paul et al., 2001; GEM Scotland, 2003 & 2004).
The problem of Angel identification, and their ‘shyness’, means that conducting
research on the Angels can be difficult and poses significant methodological
challenges. Despite these limitations, research on Angels in Scotland (Paul et al.,
2003) shows that they typically fit the profile of Angels in other developed countries
in terms of age and gender profiles. However, they differ in one key aspect in that
only a minority has experience of working in a small business environment. This may
reflect the structure of the Scottish economy within which the small business sector
has, in comparison to competitor countries, been slower to develop. The main reason
cited by Scotland-based Angels as their primary motivation to become investors was
capital growth (Paul et al., 2003). However, there were other secondary reasons such
as ‘giving something back’, now termed psychic income. Whilst most Angels are
typically ‘hands on’, wanting to be involved in the day-to-day running of the
businesses in which they invest, some do wish to remain passive investors. Therefore,
the extent of a ‘hands on’ role adopted by Angels varies from investment to
investment: ranging from offering financial advice, to providing contacts and further
networking opportunities.
Scotland-based Business Angels operate in a variety of modes: as lone wolves; as
a participant in private sector syndicates whose degree of formal organisation can
vary considerably, and as a member of a more structured Business Angel Network
(BAN). Indeed, individual angels can operate through multiple membership of any or
all of these combinations. Scotland does have an advantage over many countries by
having a well-established national BAN, known as the Local Investment Network
Company (LINC). LINC is a public/private partnership that acts as a ‘matchmaker’
by providing a service bringing together Business Angels with entrepreneurs seeking
investment funds. Membership is open to any individual with an interest in becoming
a business angel upon payment of a nominal membership fee. As a ‘network’, it is a
non-profit making body, though its individual members are clearly focused on
supporting entrepreneurs, small business start-ups, growth businesses, and wealth
creation.
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A review of the BBRS (Scottish Enterprise, 2000) resulted in a change of
emphasis in the support mechanisms designed to encourage an enterprising
economy. Assistance to small companies with growth potential, an area in which
Scotland lags behind the rest of the UK and other competitor nations, became a
priority. While noting the crucial role of the informal venture capital market in
financing new firms, the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM, 2002) recorded
that in Scotland, personal investment in other people’s businesses has declined from
an already low base of 1.2% of the adult population in 1999 to 0.8% in 2002. On this
measure, Scotland ranked fourth lowest of the 37 nations surveyed, GEM (2002)
noting that this is of particular concern since personal investment rates correlate
significantly with ‘opportunity entrepreneurship’ rates.
In response to the need for new venture capital by firms that struggled to secure
finance, Scottish Enterprise established the Scottish Co-investment Fund in 2002 to
operate in partnership with active venture capital fund managers, business angels and
business angel syndicates. Within this arrangement, the private sector partner finds
the investment opportunity, negotiates the investment deal and makes an offer to
invest its own resources. If the opportunity needs more finance than the private sector
partner can provide, the partner can call on the co-investment fund to ‘co-invest’
alongside it, on equal terms. Complementing this, Scottish Enterprise set up the
Business Growth Fund (BGF) to provide smaller loans than the Co-investment Fund.
These loans are provided within the £20,000 to £100,000 range and at least 50% of
the company’s financing needs must be met by non-public sector sources such as
Business Angels. Since the introduction of these schemes, it has been argued that
there is a further gap within the £2 - £10 million range which needs to be filled if
businesses based in Scotland are to become competitive on the international stage. In
order to address this problem Scottish Enterprise introduced a new scheme from
April 2006: the Scottish Investment Fund (SIF).
The establishment of the Scottish Co-investment Fund and the Business Growth
Fund have assisted the growth in syndication. The rationale for these schemes lies in
the belief that the main funding gap for SMEs is in the £250,000 to £1 million range
(Mason and Harrison, 2003). More recently, the performance of the equity risk
capital market over the last few years demonstrates the effectiveness of these
initiatives (Don and Harrison, 2006). Following its collapse in 2000-2001,
Scotland’s risk capital market has recovered, reflected in the volume and value of
deals ‘with a 40% increase in investment activity from 2003 to 2004 £843m was
invested in 490 young Scottish companies between 2000 and 2004’ (Don and
Harrison, 2006 p.3). Their report argues that the most dramatic shift in investment
patterns in 2004 was in the angel market, where Angel investment rose by 70%. This
impressive result needs to be qualified by the effect of a single deal where just over
half the sum was provided by Angels based outside Scotland. Nevertheless, Angel
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activity is still reported to have risen by 30%. The continued decline in venture
capital activity in this market, noted earlier, continues and is being replaced by the
number of hybrid deals. Hybrids consist of investments which involve finance from
both the private and public sectors. Even when removing three very large deals from
Angel performance data in 2004 (accounting for 35% -£60m- of the total
investment), hybrids still accounted for 11% by value, £12m investment in 87
transactions, and were involved in 55% of all transactions. Ninety per cent of these
hybrid transactions were accounted for by the Business Growth Fund, and Scottish
Co-investment Fund (Don and Harrison, 2006). Improvement in current performance
can also be seen by reference to evidence from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
with informal investment activity in Scotland more closely reflecting the UK
average. Though not a step change, it does indicate more stability in total
entrepreneurial activity, and brings Scotland into line with the rest of the UK; and
identifies it now as a relatively stronger regional economic performer. However, if
the Scottish Executive is to create ‘A Smart, Successful Scotland’ capable of
competing with other developed nations (Scottish Executive, 2001), it would be
particularly advantageous to increase the flow of angel capital and its take-up by
entrepreneurs in order to further support entrepreneurial activity, small firm start-up
and growth.
The continuing development of sources of finance for dynamic growing
businesses has been important to the promotion of economic development in
Scotland. Finance pays little attention to geographic boundaries and has the ability to
seek out investment opportunities wherever these are located (Klagge and Martin,
2005). Without local centres of finance there is a danger that finance will exit the
periphery and flow to the centre and thus restrict economic development by limiting
firm formation and expansion which in turn further impedes economic development
(Klagge and Martin, 2005). Having a relatively well established formal and informal
venture capital market within Scotland is advantageous; in particular, with their
preference for investing close to home, Scotland based business angels provide a
useful resource for entrepreneurs, which is of significance in an economy that has
suffered from low rates of new firm formation.
Business Angels in Poland
This section will assess the development of Business Angel networks in Poland both
at national and regional levels. This discussion begins with some broad background
information on private sector development and support, followed by a commentary
about the Polish entrepreneurial class before turning our attention to the
contemporary venture capital market that includes Business Angel activity.
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Poland was the first CEE country to reject communist rule and transform its
economic system from a command into a market one. Since 1989, the Polish
economy has undergone transition from a planned to a market economy with the
ownership transformation process being its main feature. Privatisation as well as new
firm formation gave rise to a large private sector in Poland.
Privatisation in Poland occurred in two major stages. First, the so called ‘small
privatisation’ was implemented in trade, construction, light manufacturing, food
processing industries, and services. The second stage, and far more complex, was
based on the privatisation of large, state owned enterprises. Consequently, the
country suffered a significant drop in the output of its state-owned sector, growing
unemployment and inflationary pressure. This required a re-positioning of the policy
stance taken by the Polish government in order to sustain domestic demand
(including interest rate cuts, and strong real wage growth) (Blazyca, 2000). Though
the privatisation process was conducted at a relatively modest pace, it did create
considerable sectoral and regional unemployment, and pressure to develop de novo
job creation (Jackson et al, 2005).
In the private sector, and especially in SMEs, the employment trends since 1990
have been mostly favourable (Roberts et al., 1997; PAED, 2004; Jackson et al, 2005).
The vast majority of private enterprises expanded in terms of the volume of business
and employment; the SME sector providing work for many people who were made
redundant by large, state-owned enterprises. In addition, Polish SMEs created jobs
for young people, who would otherwise be unemployed, and contributed 48.6% to
GDP in 2002 (PAED, 2004).
In Poland, as in the wider EU, the ‘one-man’ business is the most frequent size of
business. Though foreign direct investment is a significant contributor to economic
growth, increasingly, goods and services are also provided by a profusion of very
small enterprises and sole proprietorships (micro-enterprises). They comprise street
vendors who inhabit almost every main street of many towns, private taxis, tailors
and dress-makers, shoe repairers, hairdressers, metal and plastic-working shops, and
a whole plethora of others. These enterprises have considerable value because they
generate income, create low-cost jobs, use domestically produced raw materials and
provide goods and services at prices that can be afforded by lower income households
(Halverso-Quevedo, 1992). They are a major reservoir of employment both legal and
illegal or clandestine, and provide part-time work. Illegal employment is a
particularly Central European phenomenon, becoming most prominent in the first
half of the 1990s. The scale and impact of this phenomenon can not be ignored as it
generated around 8.1 per cent of Polish GDP in 1994, and provided one seventh of the
total personal income of an average Pole, though also creating a burgeoning ‘grey
economy’ (Grabowski and Jedrzejowicz, 1995). More recently, many of these
businesses are driven by necessity due to major shocks resulting from privatisation,
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and require some capital usually supplied from family resources, and ‘know how’
that favours those with access to capital that does not rely on the banking sector, and
the more skilled or educated (PAED, 2004).
Business decisions concerning new start-ups were significantly affected by
Poland’s transition programmes, launched on January 1st 1990, which eased
regulations, removed many restrictions, liberalised prices, and lowered entry barriers
for private business. One of the most significant components of change, central to
Poland’s strong growth since 1993, was the explosion in private sector activity
(Koen, 1998). However, towards the end of the 1990s the rate of growth of the SME
sector (measured by the number of enterprises) and the share of SMEs in GDP
generation grew at a slower rate (PAED, 2001).
Throughout the 1990s it was clear that new firm formation was crucial to the
sustainable economic development of Poland in terms of its contribution to GDP, job
creation and the containment of increasing unemployment (Ministerstwo
Gospodarki, 1999). However, regional disparities such as poor performance close to
the ‘Eastern Wall’ and successful economic growth in northern regions still pose
major problems for new firm creation as a policy instrument (Ministerstwo
Gospodarki, 1999; Jackson et al., 2005; PAED, 2004).
Institutional Support and the Financial Gap
As demonstrated above, where there are market failures , a thriving private sector
depends on support for SMEs and entrepreneurship. This includes State sponsored
funding schemes, institutional support, training, information services and technology
support. In the early stages of transition, most of this activity stemmed from foreign
aid, resulting in a whole host of programmes, schemes, initiatives and institutions
(Blazyca et al., 2002).
Institutional and financial support for SME promotion and new firm formation
gained momentum in the mid-1990s. In 1994 there were 1,000 organisations and
institutions acting in the area of SME promotion in Poland. There were 120 regional
and local development agencies and foundations, 50 centres of innovation and
enterprise promotion (including 20 incubators), 110 advising, information and
training institutions, 180 Chambers of Commerce, 26 Chambers of Crafts, and 130
various economic associations.
The number of profit-oriented institutions working for business development,
such as private consulting firms, continues to grow in Poland. But publicly funded
programmes have been less developed (Tamowicz, 2004). There were only two
examples of such programmes: the Labour Offices’ loan scheme to assist the
unemployed who want to establish their own businesses, and the Loan Guarantee
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Fund established by the Ministry of Finance. However, support for SMEs and the
private sector strengthened further at the end of 1990s, reflected in various
governmental pronouncements and documents (Danson el al, 2001). At the same
time, the government’s position towards entrepreneurship and private sector
development became strongly influenced by preparations for EU membership, and
by 2002 the majority of small firms was Polish owned and financed from private
sources (PAED, 2004).
Following EU accession, support for entrepreneurial activity was steered by the
Lisbon strategy with an emphasis on the need to boost entrepreneurship,
productivity, employment, and competitiveness. In line with an overall aim of
making Europe the world’s most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based
economic area, new initiatives in this area stem from the 2003 Green Paper on
Entrepreneurship and the Commission’s Action Plan on Entrepreneurship published
in 2004. Its five policy areas comprised: entrepreneurial mindset, incentives for
entrepreneurs, competitiveness and growth, access to finance and red tape will have a
strong impact on Poland. As Grabowski (2005) observes:
‘(this) current year is crucial for the development of new strategies and
priorities for entrepreneurial activity in the next 5-7 years.’
Venture Capital
Poland represents a new market for venture capital and private equity institutions.
The provisions of previous legislation during the immediate post-communist
transition period were insufficient to promote the functioning of venture capital
funds. The first legislative change took place on February 21, 1998 with the
introduction of the Investment Fund Act which made some provisions for closed-end
investment funds. A further amendment was introduced on 22 March 2001 when the
Polish government introduced an amendment to the Act on Investment Funds (CEC,
2002). Until then, only two closed-end investment funds were operating in the Polish
market and could be regarded as similar to venture capital funds. The amendment
allowed for a new type of investment fund, that is a specialised closed-end
investment fund created by investment fund societies. The whole process was further
facilitated by a consolidation of the Polish banking system and the creation of
pension funds.
Since then, the sector has experienced growth and attracted capital and increased
interest mainly from large international companies. However, the Polish
government’s efforts on behalf of venture capital has been limited (Tamowicz,
2003). Therefore, a majority of venture capital (in excess of 90 per cent) comes from
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abroad (Tamowicz and Stola, 2003). The first venture capital/private equity
operations began in 1990, with the establishment of ‘the Polish American Enterprise
Fund’. The same year saw the launch of a small ‘Danish Fund for Central and Eastern
Europe and Economic Initiatives’ followed by the establishment of a small ‘Society
for Social and Economic Initiatives’ in 1991 (with the involvement of French capital
among others). In March 1992, Caresbac-Polska, created with EBRD participation
and US sources, marked the foundation of a venture capital (VC) market that
combined foreign aid and governmental sources. Further new initiatives, for example
the Bialostocki and Lubelski Capital Fund, were developed with the help and support
of the British Know-How Fund. By the mid-1990s, 12 companies conducted venture
capital type activities and managed total capital funds of around $660 million
(Tamowicz and Stola, 2003).
The second half of the 1990s saw intensive growth in the activities of the private
equity houses in Poland, and in various government sponsored programmes that were
a direct result of mass privatisation (e.g. the National Investment Funds). At the end
of 2001, there were 30 venture capital/private equity firms located mainly in and
around Warsaw.
Despite this expansion of the VC market, Polish venture capital firms were still
reluctant to invest in small start-up companies due to a continued perceived high risk
in the SME sector according to the Polish Private Equity Association
(Zwierzchowski, 2004). More importantly, VCs set up minimal investment levels of
millions of dollars which are far too high for start-up firms. Thus, most new small and
micro-firms are thrown back upon self-financing sources and find access to credit
and capital for growth restricted (PAED, 2004).
However, in contrast with private equity markets operating in West European
countries (where most start-up funds are also raised from domestic sources), the
Polish venture capital/private equity market developed almost independently of any
further involvement by the Polish government which showed a lack of real
conviction in this area (Tamowicz, 2003)
Polish Entrepreneurial Class
There are various studies pertaining to the emergence and formation of an
entrepreneurial class in Poland throughout the post-communist transformation
period. One premise is that, due to an under-developed class of large-scale capitalists
in Central and Eastern Europe, the entrepreneurial class carries the responsibility for
the progress of capitalism during the transformation process (Osborn and
Slomczynski, 2005).
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The risk-taking and entrepreneurship of a considerable section of Poland’s
population allowed the economy to achieve strong economic growth between 1990
and 2000.However, Polish entrepreneurs still face important impediments to
successful activity due to excessive bureaucratic and fiscal constraints from
government, and the competitive shock resulting from EU membership
(Wyznikiewicz, 2003).
Osborn and Slomczynski (2005), in their detailed discussion of the role and
position of entrepreneurs in the social structure of contemporary Poland, note that at
the beginning of the transition process the Polish class structure underwent a
dramatic transformation which led to a new class composition. Its main features are
the emergence of the entrepreneurial class (and potentially with Business Angels as a
growing component) and the differentiation of the working class. Contrary to popular
belief, the authors argue that membership of the Communist Party did not have a
significant effect on joining the entrepreneurial class. The same is true for Hungary,
the other country within the Soviet block where the private sector and the
entrepreneurial class played an important role during the communist era.
Biographical accounts (Osborn and Slomczynski, 2005) confirm the view that
many conventional features of entrepreneurial activity dominant in capitalist systems
were also important in the formation of the ‘new’ Polish entrepreneurial class, and in
the emergence of a growing number of Business Angels. However, there also were
some uniquely Polish conditions that stimulated entrepreneurship, such as foreign
contacts and networks as well as specific government incentives and tax holidays.
Polish entrepreneurs (including Business Angels) are better educated than the
national average, and they are better off with respect to ownership or access to
economic assets. As noted above, these may be distinct features of transition
economies where there is still a risk adverse venture capital market, and restricted
access to credit for small start-up firms.
EU membership has brought with it new opportunities but also major challenges
for entrepreneurs and sustained small business growth. As Wyznikiewicz (2004)
notes:
‘However, it seems that the mental preparation of entrepreneurs for open
competition in the single market… are actually more important than the timely
preparation of a legal and economic infrastructure. In my opinion, in the initial
period of Poland’s presence in the EU, Polish entrepreneurs will have to take
lessons in integration, and for many these lessons may prove painful.’
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Business Angel Networks in Poland
The term Business Angel is relatively unknown in Poland although the phenomenon
of private investors providing funding for business ventures is not a new one (Nasz
Rynek Kapitalowy, 2004). Polish Business Angels have the same aims and operate
along similar lines as their counterparts in the West. Although their activity is in line
with the Lisbon Strategy of enhanced entrepreneurship, their functions in Poland are
much wider. As mentioned earlier, venture capital and equity markets in Poland
remained underdeveloped in the early 1990s, and Polish private entrepreneurs were
often either inexperienced or unfamiliar with the way venture capital functions.
Therefore, Polish Business Angels are faced with much greater challenges than their
western counterparts. They also fill an important investment gap for new ventures
that still exists in Poland. Polish entrepreneurs seeking funds from banks and similar
institutions often face an additional obstacle as banks look for collateral or a
guarantee that is equal to the sum of money they wish to borrow (Business Week,
2004).
Therefore, the potential for the Business Angels market in Poland is quite
considerable, although it will take time before it is fully functional (Ambor and
Tamowicz, 2004). According to Dolkowski (president of PolBAN) there are around
100 thousand people in Poland each with 1 million PLZ in disposable income (Puls
Buzinesu, 2003). If only 5 per cent of them could be persuaded to invest in one or two
business ventures this would provide sufficient seed capital of between 50 and 500
thousand PLZ each for around 10 thousand firms. However, it is not only about
access to start-up funding since Business Angels, whether ‘hands on’ or not, also
provide valuable advice, help formulate business strategies; and provide contacts and
networks.
The Business Angel network in Poland is very young, and it is too early to assess
its effectiveness given the small number of investment projects to date. However,
there are two embryonic organisations at the national level, with regional and local
networks, and these are examined below.
At the national level there are two Business Angel networks in Poland: PolBAN
and Lewiatan BA (LBA), which operate within the Polish Confederation of Private
Employers Lewiatan. PolBAN and LBA have the same aims and objectives as other
members of the European Business Angel Network (EBAN): acting as honest
brokers and a ‘marriage bureau’ for private investors and entrepreneurs who are
seeking funds for their new ventures.
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PolBan
PolBAN was established in December 2003 by Wojtek Dolkowski and three friends
who have funded 15 Polish entrepreneurs. It forms a part of EBAN; therefore it can
tap into its contacts and a wide range of networks.
It is a ‘non-profit£ organisation and its activities are now funded from a variety of
sources: sponsorships (companies and private individuals), membership fees, and
commission from PolBAN led projects (www.polban.pl). The organisation has an
office in Bydgoszcz but also operates through a network of representatives
throughout Poland. Its main aim is ‘to inform wider public about Business Angels
activities, seek potential investors and promote interesting projects£ (Puls Buzinesu,
2004). However, there are more specific aims that address a range of issues that small
firms confront when endeavouring to access finance for their businesses, and
promote their own activities:
• locate and support Business Angels in Poland,
• promote seed capital type investment at the start-up investment stage,
• help eliminate the ‘capital gap’ at an early stage of entrepreneurial activity,
• link up new projects with potential investors (BAs),
• promote new firm formation,
• improve the entrepreneurial climate and stimulate the development of the SME
sector,
• support cooperation between entrepreneurs and Business Angels,
• exchange experiences and knowledge with similar organisations abroad,
• promote foreign investment through, among others, the EBAN network,
• stimulate the business environment and create a forum for the exchange of
contacts and ideas, and
• advocate tax reductions for Business Angel type investment.
By 2005, PolBAN was associated with 20 Business Angels, and in June 2005
completed its first project (Gazeta Wyborcza, 2005).
Lewiatan BA
Lewiatan BA was established in April 2005, with 85 per cent of its funding coming
from EU sources. It collaborates with a number of organisations such as Innovation
Funds-FIRE, American, German and Irish Chambers of Commerce. However, as a
constituent part of the Polish Confederation of Private Employers, it can operate at a
regional level by using an existing network of their offices in various Polish cities.
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Similarly to PolBAN, it currently operates as a non-profit organisation but will
start charging for its services in 2007. Lewiatan BA is a very much a ‘hands on’
organisation and pays a lot of attention to project selection. It pre-selects projects,
prepares a summary document and then passes it on to a potential investor. Once the
initial meeting between an entrepreneur and BA takes place, Lewiatan BA ‘takes a
back seat’. Some of the less well defined projects are either rejected outright, or sent
back for further amendments.
Lewiatan BA calculates the amount of yearly profit at an early stage of
negotiations between an entrepreneur and the Business Angel according to Lewiatan
BA’s project manager (interview, January 2006). Its strict business focus has paid
off, and Lewiatan BA has succeeded in facilitating start-up funds for a network of
coffee bars and was instrumental in setting up an indemnity company and more
recently a software company. Lewiatan’s BA future projects will have an even more
defined focus, concentrating on information technology, renewable energy and mass
media.
Conclusion
The Business Angel phenomenon is not new, but the term has only recently become
common currency in informal venture capital markets associated with small
businesses. The parallels between Business Angel operations and networks in an
established environment such as Scotland and in transition economies like Poland are
evident. This is not surprising given that the primary motivation for Business Angels
is capital growth, and that they seek to plug gaps and failures in the venture capital
market wherever they appear. Also, small companies usually cite access to capital
and credit as major obstacles to formation and growth of their business. Interestingly,
though, is the extent to which both well founded capital markets and transition
economies have a high dependence upon micro-economic features of small business
formation including reliance on family assets, human capital, and specific
demographic features of individuals. Clearly, the capital gap is a shared feature for
the small business start-up and growth processes, and this creates similar responses
from formal and informal sources of capital. These comprise key elements for
Business Angel strategies that hinge mainly upon the generation of local, national
and international ‘networks’ in order to identify and assess investment opportunities,
and form partnerships with State financed initiatives for national and regional
economic growth, and employment. This policy arena is a common denominator for
Business Angels and small businesses alike since the SME sector is identified as the
engine of economic growth and de novo job creation in areas of sectoral and regional
decline following the loss of employment in traditional industries. The causes may
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vary, but the policy implications are very similar. In Scotland and Poland,
public/private initiatives were developed to engage venture capital with small
business start-up and growth. In both contexts, Business Angel networks responded
to these national opportunities, and in the case of Poland quickly established
European links.
The differences in the experiences of Scotland and Poland, and by extension other
CEE economies, are more related to the speed of change in the transition economies
and the capacity for national informal venture capital to gauge its response to
demand. For Poland, and other transition economies, the majority of new capital has
arrived from foreign investors as buyouts of large firms and privatisations, or as
greenfield site investments. The consequences for SMEs have been a fast flow of
funds to support these large firms and buyout opportunities, accompanied by
economic uncertainty and turbulence that induces risk averse behaviour by potential
investors in start-up firms, and a slower flow of capital into the SME sector from
external sources.
Whilst this research paper has offered some critical insights into the Angel market
in Poland the analysis is limited due to the recent emergence of the market. Further
research will focus on the developments within the Angel market monitoring the
ability of their networks to match potential investors with business opportunities. The
main focus of the paper has been on the supply side of the market and further research
needs to be undertaken to determine issues on the demand side. For example, are
businesses seeking more than equity finance from Angel investors? Why do
entrepreneurs seek Angel investment rather than bank finance? Is there a ‘pecking
order’ that entrepreneurs are following in seeking finance for a new venture? How
easy is it to secure Angel funding?
Thus, policy recommendations for the Polish economy should take into
consideration some key elements of this initial exploration of the nature and role of
Business Angels. First, given the problems of access to capital for start-up firms,
incentives could be built into the tax structure for Business Angels that might mirror
those afforded to (large) foreign corporate investors. Major economic development
targets, such as regional development, regeneration, and rural economic
sustainability could be linked to investment incentives in the SME sector and to rural
entrepreneurial activity. Second, family sourced finance for small business is a
dominant feature of start-up firms. Therefore, family focused incentives to support
SMEs through tax credits on investments would acknowledge and reward this major
source of finance. Third, job creation is a major element of economic policy and
firmly linked to the success of new business ventures, and their survival. Business
Angels play a key role in this process that needs to be better understood and
incorporated into the policy arena in Poland at an ‘early’ stage in order to capture the
full potential of this source of finance.
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